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Article 6

ZONING FOR CHURCHES'
By RON VERNoN*

IN CALIFORNIA, unlike the majority of states, a municipal ordinance which excludes all churches from residential districts is a valid
exercise of the legislative police power.2 A church, like any other
property owner, is considered on its merits as it fits into the general
scheme of comprehensive zoning.3 A church, in California, does not
have a per se right to the use of land within the regulation of zoning
ordinances, 4 authorized by the California Government Code.5
Since the Code does not enumerate churches, the municipality
must derive its power from the definition of other purposes. Does this
phrase embody all known uses of land or is it limited to uses similar to
those enumerated?
There are three types of ordinances which generally apply to
churches: 6 (1) those expressly authorizing the location of a church in
a specified zone; (2) the permissive or conditional use statute, allowing
a church to locate in an otherwise restricted district after obtaining a
permit from the designated administrative body; and (3) the wholly
exclusive ordinance, limiting churches to defined districts, and by so
doing effectively establishing private residential areas.
The most litigated question concerning the regulation of land use
for church purposes is whether this exclusive ordinance may be justified
as promoting the public health, safety, morals and the general welfare
of the community.7 The rationale urged for such a restriction is that
the general welfare is greatly promoted by establishing solely residential areas wherein the family and home may be more peacefully enjoyed. A view more widely followed, however, is that the physical
proximity of the church to the home furthers the convenience and wellbeing of the people and is therefore in furtherance of the general welfare, rather than in derogation thereof.
Member, Second Year class.
'Hereinafter
used to refer to all houses of religious worship regardless of faith.
2
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949).
3 "The petitioner is not a congregation, but holds its property as a corporation sole."
Id. at 660, 203 P.2d at 825.
4
Minney v. Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958).
5 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800: Pursuant to the provisions of the chapter, the legislative
body of any county or city may by ordinance: (a) Regulate the use of buildings, struc-

tures, and land as between agriculture, industry, business, residence and other purposes.
0 City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 362 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961)
(McWilliams, J., concurring).
7 SeeRobinson v. City and County of Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 304 P.2d

814 (1956).
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The leading case in California is Corporationof Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville.8 The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus9 to compel the defendant city to issue a permit for the construction of a church. Some
years before the passing of a municipal zoning ordinance, the petitioner had acquired vacant land partly within the city, which land was
subsequently annexed and zoned restrictively for single family residences. The ordinance classified the property within the city as: 1 0
R-1: single family residence....
R-4: unlimited residences, all uses of the preceding zones are permitted plus libraries, museums, schools, churches, and religious
institutions.
The petitioner contended that the ordinance bore no relation to the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare and thus was beyond the
police power of the state to enact. The trial court held that the petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and upon the petitioner's refusal
to amend the complaint, defendant's demurrer was sustained without
leave to amend. In affirming this ruling the District Court of Appeal
said: "We conclude that since the City had the power to zone the
property, herein affected, strictly for single family residences, there
was no abuse of the power in prohibiting the erection and construction
of church buildings therein."1 The California Supreme Court denied
a hearing and the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
12
for want of a federal question.
This was the first specific statement concerning church zoning to
be handed down in California. It had been previously established that
general business enterprises, apartments, tenements and
like structures
3
might be excluded from private residential districts.1
In City of Chico v. First Avenue Baptist Church,1 4 an ordinance
allowed a church within a residence zone upon issuance of a use permit. The city sought to enjoin the defendants (a church and several
fictitious defendants) from conducting a church service within the
zone. The trial court sustained petitioner's demurrer to the answer of
unconstitutionality, issuing a judgment on the pleadings. The church
then applied for a use permit and it was granted. However, one of the
fictitious defendants appealed on the constitutional ground that the
decree violated his rights to the freedom of worship. The injunction,
as against him, was affirmed. The appellate court held that since he
had not exhausted his administrative remedies (by applying for a per8 90

Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949).

9 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.

§§ 1084, 1086.

10 90 Cal. App. 2d at 658, 203 P.2d at 823.

11 Id. at 659, 203 P.2d at 824.
12 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
13
14

Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238 P.2d 587 (1951).
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mit), he was in no position to attack the ordinance. This was based
upon the premise that the Porterville decision was a complete answer
to appellant's contentions, in that a zoning ordinance restricting
churches was a justifiable exercise of police power. It should be noted
that the ordinance here in question was of the permissive use type, not
wholly exclusionary as in the Porterville case.
In Minney v. Azusa' 5 the District Court of Appeal affirmed the
denial of petitioner's variance and sustained the defendant's demurrer
to the complaint without leave to amend. The petitioner applied for
a variance1 to be admitted to an R-1 district under the following
ordinance17
1-1: one family dwellings, agriculture, horticulture, libraries, museums, parks, public schools and community buildings, owned
by the municipality or school districts....
R.3: any use permitted in R-1 ... plus flat buildings, churches and

parochial schools.

The sole question before the court on the application for a variance to
the zoning ordinance was the appropriateness of the discretion used
by the administrative board upon the petitioner's application. That
five other churches had obtained variances under this ordinance, was
held not to establish the existence of unreasonable discrimination.
Therefore, the denial of this variance would not be disturbed in the
absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, since it is presumed that the ordinance is adapted to promote the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare of the community., The court
would not hear the question of constitutionality since an application
for a variance presupposes the reasonableness of the regulation; and
one may not retain the benefit of an act while attacking the constitutionality of one of its important conditions. 19 Therefore, the application for the variance recognized the validity of the ordinance and
precluded a subsequent attack thereon. The court relied upon the
Porterville case for assuming the ordinance of the City of Azusa to be
valid; as this was a similar ordinance, excluding all churches by implication. The court displayed a clear reluctance to interfere with the
legislative plan. 29
15 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958).
U 6 POWELL, REAL PnoPzRT- § 870 (1958).
17 164 Cal. App. 2d at 17, 330 P.2d at 257.
18
Lockard v. City and County of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949);
46 WEST CAL. DrG. Zoning §§ 671, 672, 674 (1952); 6 POWELrL, REAL PROPERTY § 871
(1958).
19 United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1939).
20 "Though we might have included churches in the R-1 zone had we drafted the
ordinance, that fact alone would not now justify interference with the results achieved
by the public body charged with that duty." 164 Cal. App. 2d at 25, 330 P.2d at 262.
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In Garden Grove Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Garden Grove,2 1 this same court reviewed another decision denying
petitioner a writ of mandamus to compel the administrative board to
issue a permit allowing erection of the petitioner's church in a residence zone. Under the ordinance the lot could be improved by erection of a single family dwelling only, unless there had been a permit
granted for a conditional use or a zone variance. The planning commission ruled that the church had not complied with certain requirements enumerated by the conditional use provisions. The petitioner
contended these requirements were unconstitutional and that he
should be granted a variance. The court refused the writ of mandate
saying that the application for a zone variance does not involve a matter of right but becomes a matter of grace and permission, and therefore may not be controlled by the writ of mandamus. This differs from
the ruling under a conditional use permit. The conditional use is prescribed by the ordinance and by conforming to its terms an applicant
may gain a right thereunder.2 2 The court distinguished the petitioner's
position. By not complying with the requirements of the ordinance
the church had not gained a right under the ordinance. The court
found no abuse of discretion in refusing the application for the variance, therefore the writ of mandamus would not issue.
This decision put impetus behind the Porterville and Azusa rulings.
It now became firmly established that a church would not be afforded
a remedy against a zoning ordinance unless a right had been established thereunder. The only way to establish a right was by strict
adherence to the provisions of the regulation. By construing the ordinance broadly, the courts refused to usurp the powers of the administrative board.
Some ordinances have attempted to restrict the construction of
parochial schools. In Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. of San Francisco
v. City of Piedmont,23 the writ to compel issuance of a building permit
was granted. The zoning ordinance excluded private schools from a
district where public schools had already been built. The court distinguished this ordinance from the wholly exclusive type by noting
that here only private schools are excluded-not all churches as in
Porterville.
However, in Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors of Orange
County,24 the ordinance in question was wholly exclusive. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of Supervisors
to set aside the order granting a variance for establishment of a church
and school in an area zoned for residences. No schools were present
21 176 Cal. App. 2d 136, 1 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1959).
22 Redwood City Corp. of Jehoval's Witnesses v. City of Menlo Park, 167 Cal. App.
2d 686, 335 P.2d 195 (1959).
23 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955).
24 170 Cal. App. 2d 619, 339 P.2d 914 (1959).
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in the district. The co-defendant church argued that the ordinance was
discriminatory on its face since the municipality could not regulate
against state schools, and therefore, parochial schools were not allowed
their equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
The court held: first, by analogy to the Porterville case, the ordinance was non-discriminatory since it excluded all schools; and second,
there was a distinction between equal protection under the law and
the equating of private rights with those of the sovereign. The court
held "due process under the law" and "equal treatment of private and
state rights" not to be synonymous.
The only real distinction between these two cases was that since
public schools had already been erected in the city of Piedmont, the
court did not deem it proper to exclude private schools. However, in
the Tustin Heights case the court was on firmer ground since no
schools had been erected. For what other reason should the ordinance
be declared valid simply because it wholly excluded, when the effect
is identical to that of an ordinance which specifically excludes? There
seems to be little difference where one ordinance excludes by law
while the other does so on its face.
In summarizing the California decisions certain points stand out:
(1) Excluding all churches and schools is non-discriminatory under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
(2) Houses of worship must be considered equally with other land
uses in the planning of residential communities.
(3) The courts will seldom interfere with a zoning ordinance
based upon public welfare.
(4) All of the decisions directly affecting churches were handed
down by an intermediate court. Neither the California nor United
States Supreme Court has directly passed upon the constitutionality of
an ordinance which wholly excludes churches from specified districts.
The fact that these courts have declined to2 5review these causes does
not imply a negative view upon the merits.
The California ruling is a minority view, having been followed in
only one other jurisdiction. 26
The weight of authority 27 holds that churches may not be absolutely excluded from residential areas, either as a matter of the express
language of a zoning regulation or as a matter of administrative application or enforcement of a neutrally worded ordinance. The contention is that such an exclusionary ruling bears no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the coimu25

Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950).
Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach,
82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955), (zoned for single family residences, golf courses, playgrounds,
and municipal buildings); 74 A.L.R.2d 406-09 § 20 (1960).
27
Cases collected in 74 A.L.R.2d 380-81, § 2 (1960); 2 MEIZENBAuM, ZoNING,
1458-67 (2d ed. 1955). See 6 PowErn, B.
PAoLrany § 872 (1958).
26
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nity. Generally, the rationale is that churches are not to be considered
along with other users of land.
A recent Missouri case, Congregation Temple of Israel v. City of
Creve Couer,28 involved an attack upon an act empowering the municipality to zone. The wording of the act was similar to that in the
29
California statute. The Missouri court applied ejusdem generis, limiting general terms following specific ones to matters similar to those
enumerated. The court held this doctrine negativing an implied authority to control the location of schools or other public buildings, under a general provision like that in the California Government Code
section 65800, was well established. They reasoned that since First
Amendment freedoms are considered to be even stronger constitutional provisions than those concerning public schools, it did not
therefore seem that the legislature intended to include churches in the
phrase "other purposes," either.
California recognizes ejusdem generis as a rule of construction to
aid in ascertaining the meaning of the legislature, 30 and it would seem
feasible for it to have held that the legislature did not intend to include
the regulation of church construction in the general provision "other
purposes.
To uphold exclusionary ordinances it must be shown that the use
would have such an effect upon the area that exclusion therefrom
would promote the general welfare of the community.3 ' To so hold it
must be found that the increased traffic hazards, noise and congestion,
which may interfere with the peace and quiet enjoyment of the home,
outweigh the general welfare which would be promoted by allowing
the physical proximity of the church to the schools and homes which
traditionally it teaches and serves.
Further, it must be determined whether the exclusion of churches
imposes a burden upon the freedom of worship which is not commensurate with the promotion of the general welfare secured by that exclusion.32 Freedom of worship under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution has been defined as an absolute freedom to
believe, but a qualified freedom to act,33 but any regulation must be
neither discriminatory nor unreasonable. This is the rationale of the
California ruling. 34 The majority of states have determined that the
320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
"Of the same kind, class or nature," BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951).
30 People v. Strickler, 25 Cal. App. 60, 142 Pac. 1121 (1914); Coleman v. City of
Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715, 295 Pac. 59 (1930); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680
(1950).
31 State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees, 108
N.W.2d 288, 296 (Wis. 1961).
28
29

32 Ibid.

33Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
34 State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenat-

chee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957).
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absolute exclusion of churches does not adequately promote the general welfare in order to justify any qualification of the First Amendment.
Conclusion
The distinction between the California view and the majority view
appears to be in the definition of general welfare. The majority view
emphasizes traditional humanistic values. It contends that different
considerations are involved in any regulation when the user of the land
is a church. The California position emphasizes the best and most reasonable utilization of land possible and holds that a church must fit
into a comprehensive zoning plan as would any other property owner.
Reasonable minds may differ as to the more desirable view. Some
argue the physical undesirabilities of churches outweigh the social
value; others, that absolute freedom of religion as affecting the character of the individual is of greater importance than empirical values.
If the public laws are to be used to bar churches from specified
areas, certain groups of citizens could conceivably control the practice
of religion in widespread areas. Whole towns could successfully bar
churches from within their limits. These abuses are fortunately theoretical, but legally possible under Cailfornia's present decisions.
To prevent such possible abuses and to clarify the law, it would be
desirable for the legislature to make more definite its intent to regulate
land use for church purposes. The wisdom of this decision should not
be left to judicial review, on a case to case basis.

